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Abstract
Background: Surveillance and intervention are resource-using activities of strategies to mitigate the unwanted
effects of disease. Resources are scarce, and allocating them to disease mitigation instead of other uses necessarily
involves the loss of alternative sources of benefit to people. For society to obtain the maximum benefits from
using resources, the gains from disease mitigation must be compared to the resource costs, guiding decisions
made with the objective of achieving the optimal net outcome.
Discussion: Economics provides criteria to guide decisions aimed at optimising the net benefits from the use of
scarce resources. Assessing the benefits of disease mitigation is no exception. However, the technical complexity of
mitigation means that economic evaluation is not straightforward because of the technical relationship of
surveillance to intervention. We argue that analysis of the magnitudes and distribution of benefits and costs for
any given strategy, and hence the outcome in net terms, requires that mitigation is considered in three
conceptually distinct stages. In Stage I, ‘sustainment’, the mitigation objective is to sustain a free or acceptable
status by preventing an increase of a pathogen or eliminating it when it occurs. The role of surveillance is to
document that the pathogen remains below a defined threshold, giving early warning of an increase in incidence
or other significant changes in risk, and enabling early response. If a pathogen is not contained, the situation
needs to be assessed as Stage II, ‘investigation’. Here, surveillance obtains critical epidemiological information to
decide on the appropriate intervention strategy to reduce or eradicate a disease in Stage III, ‘implementation’.
Stage III surveillance informs the choice, timing, and scale of interventions and documents the progress of
interventions directed at prevalence reduction in the population.
Summary: This article originates from a research project to develop a conceptual framework and practical tool for
the economic evaluation of surveillance. Exploring the technical relationship between mitigation as a source of
economic value and surveillance and intervention as sources of economic cost is crucial. A framework linking the
key technical relationships is proposed. Three conceptually distinct stages of mitigation are identified. Avian
influenza, salmonella, and foot and mouth disease are presented to illustrate the framework.
Background
The broad use of animal disease surveillance (definitions
of key terms used can be found in Appendix 1) is illu-
strated by numerous systems in place worldwide. Sur-
veillance is used for early warning when disease (re-)
occurs, to detect infection or disease, to measure preva-
lence or incidence of pathogens or hazards found in
animal populations or along the food chain, to inform
intervention activities to reduce or eradicate disease, and
to document freedom from disease, infection or the
level of chemical contaminants in food products. In a
broader sense, surveillance can be considered as a scien-
tific, factual tool that informs policy decisions and the
allocation of resources for disease control [1].
This paper originates from a research project that
aimed to develop a conceptual framework and practical
tool for the economic evaluation of surveillance. The
development of a generic economic framework
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veillance approach or design, demands understanding of
the technical relationship between the components of
mitigation that impact on the economic value of surveil-
lance. The aim was to explore the relationship between
surveillance, intervention and mitigation systematically
as a foundation for empirical research into the economic
value of mitigation.
In economic terms, animal production systems exist to
provide economic value, i.e. the sense of personal well-
being or benefit gained by people as a result of consum-
ing animal goods or services created by the transforma-
tion of resources. People not only derive substantial
value from animal products such as eggs, meat, wool, or
leather, but also from animals kept as pets, used for
sports, work, or research. Disease reduces the quantity
of outputs produced from the resources committed to
animal production and thus the benefits people obtain
from them. As a result, additional resources are needed
to mitigate such negative effects. Mitigation, sometimes
regarded as synonymous with control, is defined as the
process of making the effects of disease less severe by
avoiding, containing, reducing or removing it. Both sur-
veillance and intervention are resource-using activities
that are part of a mitigation strategy. Effective surveil-
lance helps to offset negative effects of disease on ani-
mal and food production by promoting successful
interventions. In assessing the rationality of any
resource-using decision, the key criterion is whether the
value of outputs consequently recovered is at least suffi-
cient to cover the additional resource costs. Thus the
cost of resources committed to mitigation should at
least be compensated by the value of the resulting
recovered outputs and, ideally, the net benefits (total
output value recovered minus total mitigation costs)
should be maximised, thus optimising economic
efficiency.
The scale and combinations in which surveillance and
intervention resources are used determine the total
costs and benefits of mitigation, and thus the net effect
on people’s economic well-being. Technical efficiency
refers to the physical relation between resources used
and the related outcome and is a prerequisite for eco-
nomic efficiency [2]. Therefore, the precursor to eco-
nomic appraisal is acquired understanding of the
technical relationships between surveillance, intervention
and mitigation.
There is a wide range of definitions, concepts and
characteristics of surveillance available. Moreover, sev-
eral classification systems for surveillance are in place
that focus on surveillance approach, design, manage-
ment, networking and epidemiological criteria [3-5].
Even though such systems are useful in understanding
the approach, structure and design of surveillance
systems, they do not systematically address the techni-
cal relationship between key elements of mitigation
essential to the economic analysis of mitigation. To the
authors’ knowledge, no economic study has explicitly
considered the basic technical relationship between
surveillance, intervention and mitigation; aggregate
conceptual units which are the fundamental elements
for consideration when making recommendations for
disease mitigation policies which are economically
efficient.
Surveillance provides information to guide decisions
about the nature and scope of interventions aimed at
prevalence or incidence reduction. In general, any infor-
mation system is designed for problem solving in a
social system. The data collection and analysis that con-
tribute to the provision of information to policy makers
should always be built on a solid conceptual base [6].
Factors including the frequency and methods of data
collection, and the related levels of personnel and insti-
tutional infrastructure needed, depend on the quality
and scope of information required by policy makers to
support their decision-making.
Because the economic assessment of animal disease
surveillance must explicitly acknowledge the relationship
between disease mitigation, a process that enhances eco-
nomic benefits, and mitigation resources, a source of
economic costs, it also provides essential guidance for
the design of suitable information systems.
Therefore, the objective of this article is to show how
the technical relationships between animal disease sur-
veillance, intervention and mitigation can be integrated
as a conceptual framework to guide economic analysis
in practical applications. The conceptual framework pre-
sented builds on logical reasoning, practical experience
and observations of how mitigation processes evolve
over time in animal health services.
Discussion
Technical relationship between animal disease
surveillance, intervention and mitigation
The mitigation process can be divided into three stages:
sustainment, investigation and implementation (Figure
1). Each stage is defined by specific mitigation objectives
and has implications for the pursuit of economic
efficiency.
The economic objective of mitigation is independent
of the pathogen, animals and animal-derived products,
or surveillance approach or design. At any stage, the
principal surveillance objective is to provide information
to policy makers to support intervention decisions.
Importantly, the three stages are a continuum, the start-
ing point for analysis found anywhere on this mitigation
continuum depending on the pathogen in question and
the specific disease situation.
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mals, zoonotic diseases, food-borne hazards, vector-
borne infections, and resistant pathogens and resistance
genes. Their categorisation into endemic, (re-)emerging
or exotic depends on the initial disease status of a coun-
try. Certain endemic diseases may have been present for
al o n gt i m e ,w h i l eo t h e r sm a yh a v ee m e r g e da n d
become endemic, because there were no or insufficient
mitigation measures in place. For the purposes of this
paper, the starting point is set in the sustainment stage,
an actual situation for many diseases in developed
countries.
At the start of the mitigation cycle, a pathogen is
viewed either as not present in the unit of interest (e.g.
farm, region, country) or present at an acceptable level.
In the ‘sustainment’ stage, the mitigation objective is to
keep the free or acceptable status either by preventing
an increase in incidence of a pathogen or by eliminating
a pathogen quickly when it occurs. The surveillance
function is therefore to document that a pathogen
remains below a defined threshold, and to provide early
warning of an increase in incidence or other significant
changes in risk (e.g. higher pathogenicity, new subtype).
Early warning may trigger a rapid response to contain
an increase in incidence of the pathogen (e.g. disease
outbreak). If the response measures are insufficient to
contain the pathogen, a change in strategy is needed.
Mitigation activities switch to the ‘investigation’ stage.
The objective of this second stage is to assess the situa-
tion as a forerunner to providing guidance for interven-
tion activities in the subsequent ‘implementation’ stage.
‘Investigation’ stage surveillance is therefore to obtain
critical epidemiological information, for example about
disease incidence or prevalence and the direction and
rate of dispersion. Such information is to inform deci-
sions about the intervention strategy appropriate to
reduce or eradicate a pathogen. At the ‘implementation’
stage, the objective is to reduce the prevalence of a
pathogen in relation to a defined target based on epide-
miologic, economic or political criteria by implementing
intervention measures. The corresponding surveillance
is then to inform the choice, timing and scale of inter-
vention measures and to document the progress in the
light of interventions. Finally, after successful interven-
tion the mitigation objective may again revert to the
sustained absence of disease.
In the following sections, the three mitigation stages,
related surveillance and intervention as well as the tran-
sitions between the stages are described in more detail.
Surveillance in Stage I mitigation (’sustainment’)
A. Mitigation objective In Stage I, the level of risk must
be perceived to be acceptable by decision-makers. The
ideal risk would be zero, but in its absence an accepta-
ble level of risk is generally defined as a situation for
which no special intervention activities need to be direc-
ted at the pathogen [7]. The acceptable status may be a
Figure 1 Schematic illustration of surveillance objectives in relation to a three stage mitigation system. A: (re-)emerging or exotic
epidemic pathogen that is not controlled by response measures, B: (re-)emerging or exotic epidemic pathogen that is controlled by response
measures, C: continuous free status, D: endemic disease, dotted line: true value unknown.
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from infection, or contamination of food products main-
tained below a defined threshold. Policy makers also
may be aware of certain endemic pathogens, but cate-
gorise them as low priority and therefore do not tackle
them. In short, the Stage I mitigation objective is to sus-
tain the acceptable status. Additionally, compliance with
international regulations to document disease freedom
may facilitate access to foreign markets.
B. Surveillance and intervention Surveillance informa-
tion is used to document that a pathogen is not present
or only in less than a specified proportion of the popula-
tion, that an endemic status remains stable and to give
an early warning signal if the situation is altered. Even
though intervention measures are generally not needed
in this stage, they are anticipated to combat a pathogen
quickly when it occurs and are usually laid down in
national contingency plans or equivalent regulations. If
surveillance gives an alarm, response interventions will
be implemented to contain the disease and prevent
further spread (e.g. outbreak control). In such cases, the
free status may be (temporarily) suspended until
response activities effectively contain the disease. Classi-
cal intervention measures for infectious diseases include
testing-and-culling, movement bans, quarantine, and
emergency vaccination.
According to the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE), a country, region or zone can declare
itself historically or officially free from disease or infec-
tion provided it presents evidence based on surveillance
information [8]. European Union (EU) regulations stipu-
late specific requirements for their member countries to
document disease freedom using surveillance. Owing to
the continuing costs of such surveys, these requirements
have triggered efforts to demonstrate disease freedom
using novel, more efficient designs such as risk-based
sample size calculation of consecutive national surveys
[9] or the integration of multiple sources of random and
non-random surveillance data in stochastic scenario tree
models [10]. In food safety, surveillance is an established
tool to demonstrate that chemical contaminants (e.g.
pesticides, veterinary drugs, food additives) do not
exceed critical values in food products [11].
The surveillance approach and design chosen may
vary over time. Changes in external factors such as the
international disease situation (e.g. increase in geogra-
phical distribution and worldwide incidence of a specific
disease) or environmental or behavioural patterns that
facilitate the introduction and spread of a pathogen (e.g.
establishment of new insect vectors due to climate
change, conversion of rain forests into farmland) as well
as political priorities and trends may impact on real and
perceived risks. Hence there may be a shift from a situa-
tion with minimal risk of pathogen incursion or
augmentation, and consequently a low level of alert to
one where higher vigilance is required. Many surveil-
lance designs, such as sentinel, risk-based or syndromic
surveillance have the ability to detect rare cases and can
be highly sensitive.
Some endemic diseases relevant to public health are
notifiable but not subject to systematic surveillance. In
s u c hc a s e st h e r ea r es p o r a d i cs u r v e i l l a n c ed a t aa b o u t
cases occurring in the population, but the true preva-
lence is generally not known. For example, toxoplasmo-
sis in animals is notifiable in Switzerland, but not
subject to systematic surveillance.
C. Transition Should Stage I surveillance and response
measures fail, adaptation of mitigation to contain an epi-
demic will be required and the next two stages may
have to be considered. The transition in that case is not
clear-cut and depends on various factors, the most
important one likely being the ability of decision-makers
to assess the situation and promote a change in strategy.
No specific surveillance information will be available for
endemic pathogens not of high priority in stage I. How-
ever, endemic pathogens may move up the priority list
due to changes in the international disease situation (e.
g. neighbouring countries successfully implementing
intervention programmes), an increase in knowledge
about the pathogens, the eradication of other public
health pathogens and/or the availability of new technol-
ogies. Another reason for a shift in priorities may be
political preferences and the availability of resources.
Any change in priority will cause a transition to Stage II.
Surveillance in Stage II mitigation (’investigation’)
A. Mitigation objective In Stage II, problem analysis is
needed to understand the problem and guide decision-
making as a precursor to Stage III mitigation for both
endemic and epidemic pathogens. In the process, alter-
native strategies are assessed taking into account techni-
cal, social, economic, institutional and/or management
considerations. Finally, a decision is made about whether
to implement Stage III mitigation or not.
B. Surveillance and intervention Stage II surveillance
is used to obtain epidemiological indicators such as
prevalence, incidence, morbidity, mortality, geographi-
cal distribution, and frequency of risk or preventive
f a c t o r s .T h ed a t ap r o v i d e da r eaq u a n t i t a t i v eb a s i st o
help policy makers decide if intervention measures are
needed and to inform the selection of the appropriate
intervention strategy to reduce prevalence of disease. It
describes the initial conditions and serves as the foun-
dation for future intervention. Response measures from
Stage I may be continued, while further surveillance
data are collected to inform alternative or complemen-
tary strategies. Sometimes, intervention measures may
be pilot-tested to assess the effectiveness of putative
interventions.
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line and comparable values for prevalence or incidence
of pathogens found in animal populations or along the
food chain. Moreover, they are used to assess the geo-
graphical distribution and to quantify risk or preventive
factors or other epidemiological indicators. Depending
on both the pathogen and national characteristics, such
as the professional standard of the animal health service
and availability of animal databases and resources, the
sampling design may be probabilistic or non-probabilis-
tic. Random or probability sampling implies choosing
the sampling unit (e.g. individuals, herds, farms, slaugh-
terhouses, administrative areas) such that each has the
same chance of selection [12]. A range of sampling
methods is available, such as simple random, systematic,
stratified, cluster or multi-stage sampling. In the non-
probability design, the sample is usually selected on the
basis of the accessibility or the purposive judgment of
the researcher.
In laboratory-based surveillance, collaboration among
national and international laboratories enables sharing
of various types of epidemiological and pathogen-speci-
fic information to produce high quality data. Serotyping
or molecular subtyping of pathogens provides important
epidemiological data about the infectious agent [13].
This is valuable information contributing to the investi-
gation of the source and risk of infection and the design
of effective intervention strategies.
C. Transition The surveillance information feeds into
technical, social, economic, institutional and/or manage-
ment considerations that impact on the decision to
implement an intervention programme and thus the
transition to Stage III. If Stage II surveillance demon-
strates no immediate need to act, decision makers may
decide to wait and gather further data to inform deci-
sions about the specific nature of future intervention
programmes. If there is insufficient knowledge about a
pathogen and/or the technical or financial resources
necessary to acquire it are unavailable, surveillance
information will contribute to the general body of
knowledge, increasing disease awareness and laboratory
expertise, but there will not yet be a transition to Stage
III. Otherwise, if Stage III mitigation is shown to be fea-
sible and beneficial, the decision is made to move on to
that next stage.
Surveillance in Stage III mitigation (’implementation’)
A. Mitigation objective In Stage III mitigation, the
focus is on problem resolution, where the planned inter-
vention strategies are implemented to reduce or eradi-
cate a pathogen. The strategy and targets are well-
defined, and the elements necessary to support the miti-
gation process such as finances, infrastructure, expertise,
information networks, and data flow have been taken
into account. Further, surveillance and intervention
activities have been clearly defined.
B. Surveillance and intervention Stage III surveillance
provides essential input for programmes established to
reduce or eradicate diseases and to enhance food safety.
It is an essential tool throughout the whole stage and its
objective changes over time. First, it is used to identify
animals or herds eligible for intervention. Surveillance
data can classify animals or holdings as infected or non-
infected and thus mark them as intervention subjects.
Second, surveillance is also used to monitor the progress
and effectiveness of intervention measures (mid-term
evaluation) and, ultimately, to verify their success (final
evaluation). For example, it can be used to check the
proportion of immunised animals after a vaccination
campaign, or to antigen test newborn animals expected
to be free from infection. There is a wide range of inter-
vention measures available to reduce or eradicate a
pathogen. These include culling or medical treatment of
diseased animals, vaccination, vector control, promotion
of resistant breeds, and deliberate exposure to infected
animals to promote natural immunisation. They are
often flanked by information and awareness-raising cam-
paigns, on-farm bio-security and reorganisation of struc-
tures that impact on disease spread, such as live animal
markets or transportation systems. If surveillance data
suggest that the change in prevalence is not as large as
expected, the necessary steps can be taken to implement
corrective measures.
The surveillance design needs to be flexible over time
depending on the pathogen, mitigation target, and pro-
gress of the intervention programme. Thus, the sam-
pling scheme, sample size, and selection of diagnostic
tests may change with decreasing prevalence. The OIE
grants official recognition of freedom from bovine spon-
giform encephalopathy, foot and mouth disease (FMD),
rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia [8]
and stipulates detailed surveillance requirements to pro-
vide evidence for disease freedom. For all other diseases,
it is the responsibility of individual countries to select
appropriate surveillance strategies to demonstrate that
an intervention has been successful.
C. Transition The attainment of the mitigation target
defines the endpoint of Stage III. However, after many
years of Stage III mitigation activities the programme
may become institutionalised and stagnate in Stage III
instead of moving to Stage I. Surveillance that keeps the
effects of intervention under review will provide infor-
mation to policy makers to support the decision about
the right time to cease the programme. If decision-
makers opt for the transition to Stage I, mitigation activ-
ities will focus once again on sustaining an acceptable
level of a pathogen.
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The favourable free status may be kept for a prolonged
time period and possibly indefinitely. However, all
pathogens that are not present or exist at a very low
level because of historical freedom or successful mitiga-
tion have the potential to (re-)occur, spread and become
endemic if mitigation measures are not adequate or suf-
ficient. Thus it is essential to keep mitigation and its
related surveillance activities flexible, up-to-date, and
equipped to respond adequately to dynamic challenges.
Three examples to illustrate the conceptual framework
1. Avian influenza
With the emergence of highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza (HPAI) H5N1 in South-East Asia in the past dec-
ade and its spread to Europe, policy makers recognised
the need for multidisciplinary surveillance teams that
detect the virus early to limit its spread, clinical effects,
and economic costs. The Food and Agricultural Organi-
sation of the United Nations implemented an early
warning surveillance system for the worldwide integra-
tion and exchange of avian influenza information [14].
The EU quickly introduced new legislation to accommo-
date the altered risk. Many countries that have never
had a case of HPAI implemented extensive surveillance
system in wild birds and poultry to detect an incursion
of HPAI quickly and to be able to contain an outbreak
without delay. The strategy proved to be successful, as
all sporadic HPAI outbreaks in EU member states could
be contained within a few months using classical
response measures, i.e. all countries stayed at Stage I.
However, in other regions of the world, similar mea-
sures were unsuccessful. For example in China, Viet-
nam, Egypt and Indonesia, the disease spread widely
despite the implementation of response measures [15].
The situation in Vietnam where HPAI was reported for
the first time in 2003 illustrates the consequences of
Stage I failure.
A. Mitigation objective The current objective of the
Vietnamese programme against HPAI H5N1 is the ‘sus-
tained country-wide elimination of the virus’ [16].
B. Surveillance and intervention After detecting the
disease for the first time in 2003, Vietnam implemented
a stamping out programme for infected and at-risk
flocks to control the disease [15]. However, culling 45
million poultry failed to eliminate infection and prevent
human cases, so it was necessary to adapt the strategy.
Surveillance information was gathered to inform the
development of a vaccination campaign that aimed at
complementing existing measures [16]. Vietnam’si n t e -
grated national operational programme for avian influ-
enza from 2006 to 2010 outlined an intervention
programme with four pillars: 1) rapid identification and
response to disease outbreaks, 2) risk-based vaccination,
3) enhanced management, and 4) control of poultry
movements and development of disease-free compart-
ments [17]. Surveillance activities for HPAI in Vietnam
foresaw clinical case reporting, surveys on markets and
slaughterhouses to improve knowledge of virus circula-
tion, and mapping of temporal and spatial distributions
of wild birds [17]. Further, surveillance was conducted
to assess vaccination protection and to investigate the
cause and implement corrective measures if the results
were not satisfactory [16]. It was also used to demon-
strate whether viruses were still circulating and to assess
their antigenic makeup and their distribution. Based on
new information that is continuously becoming avail-
able, Vietnamese animal health authorities have been
modifying the intervention programme to increase its
effectiveness.
C. Transition Vietnam may cease vaccination once the
risk of infection has significantly decreased, if surveil-
lance and disease reporting systems manage to detect
and investigate all cases of suspected HPAI, and if pro-
duction and marketing methods that are risk factors for
virus transmission have been changed [16].
Summary Vietnam is currently in Stage III mitigation
aiming at eradicating HPAI. After successful eradication,
it is expected to move from Stage III to Stage I mitiga-
tion and related surveillance.
2. Salmonella in the European Union
EU regulation 2160/2003 laid the foundation for
enhanced food safety by obliging member states to run
national control programmes to reduce salmonella in
poultry and pigs. Its purpose was to ‘ensure that proper
and effective measures are taken to detect and control
salmonella’. It provided a framework for the definition
of targets, the approval of mitigation programmes, and
the adoption of rules regarding intervention methods
and trade. For each target group (breeding flocks, laying
hens, broilers, turkeys, breeding and fattening pigs) it
was envisaged to conduct a baseline survey, define
reduction targets for all member states and to imple-
ment national mitigation programmes to reduce preva-
lence in the EU. The mitigation programme in laying
hens illustrates Stage II and III activities.
A. Mitigation objective The two main objectives of the
programme were to set EU targets for the reduction of
salmonella and to achieve the defined targets by imple-
menting national mitigation programmes.
B. Surveillance and intervention The primary objective
of the baseline survey in laying hens was to estimate the
prevalence of Salmonella spp. in commercial large-scale
holdings to inform setting EU targets. Other objectives
were to investigate the relative sensitivity of faecal and
environmental samples, the role of vaccination and to
collect additional epidemiological information such as
serotypes and flock sizes [18]. The EU decision 2004/
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frame, laboratory analysis, data collection, analysis and
communication. Results fromt h eb a s e l i n es u r v e yw e r e
used to stipulate mitigation targets (Regulation 1168/
2006) and all EU member states were obliged to submit
plans for their national programmes setting out the
intervention measures envisaged. After getting the
approval from the European Commission, member
states implemented surveillance to detect Salmonella
spp. and the related interventions following case detec-
tion. The EU regulation 1168/2006 outlines the surveil-
lance scheme necessary to ‘verify the achievement of the
Community target for the reduction of salmonella’.
Thus, surveillance data provided during this phase are
not only an important element for effective and success-
ful intervention, but are also used to check the progress
of the intervention programmes.
C. Transition Results from the baseline survey were
used to define EU targets and to design national mitiga-
tion plans for the reduction of salmonella. Member
states implemented these plans and consequently have
moved on to Stage III. Once the targets for Salmonella
spp. in laying hens are achieved, transition to Stage I
may be considered and the sampling protocols adapted
accordingly.
Summary While the EU mitigation programme for sal-
monella in laying hens and related surveillance and
intervention measures have passed from Stage II to
Stage III, the situation is different for pigs where deci-
sions regarding the setting of control targets and the
implementation of intervention strategies are under
discussion.
3. Foot and mouth disease in Europe
Foot and mouth disease was endemic in Europe from
the 17
th until the mid 20
th century. The development of
effective vaccines allowed implementation of vaccination
campaigns that reduced the number of FMD outbreaks
from almost 900,000 in 1951/52 to 34 between 1977
and 1987 [19]. These campaigns were accompanied by
on-farm surveillance, import restrictions and outbreak
response measures. In the late 1980s, vaccination was
forbidden in Denmark, the UK and Ireland, while the
other nine EU member states were still using vaccina-
tion. At the same time, evidence accumulated that there
were no endemic foci in the EU member states anymore
[20]. Because the EU aimed for an intra-Community
market with the free movement of animals and their
products, political pressure for a unified strategy at EU
level increased. Despite reluctance among veterinarians
and farmers to abandon the vaccination strategy, the EU
decided to implement a FMD vaccination ban in 1992,
which ended several decades of vaccination [20]. Cessa-
tion of the vaccination programme was only possible
because internal (e.g. vaccine producing laboratories)
and external (e.g. illegal trade of animals and animal
products) sources of infection were considered to be of
negligible risk. Also, high quality veterinary services
were in place that enabled the transition to Stage I miti-
gation (pers. communication U. Kihm). A recurrence of
FMD would trigger outbreak control measures as laid
down in national contingency plans until the re-declara-
tion of freedom from FMD.
In short, in the years preceding the start of the mitiga-
tion programmes by vaccination (1953), the feasibility of
an intervention campaign was assessed and effective vac-
cines were developed (Stage II). After nearly 40 years of
vaccination to reduce and ultimately eradicate disease
(Stage III), a vaccination ban stipulated in 1992 enabled
the transition to the sustainment stage. The mitigation
programme for FMD in Switzerland that suffered its last
FMD outbreak in 1980 illustrates prolonged Stage I sus-
tainment after successful eradication.
A. Mitigation objective Switzerland aims to sustain its
FMD-free status as stipulated in the Swiss Animal
Health Ordinance (SR 916.401).
B. Surveillance and intervention Foot and mouth dis-
ease is notifiable, but there is no active surveillance pro-
gramme in place. A national contingency plan is
available that stipulates the response measures to be
applied in the event of an outbreak. It lays down specific
requirements regarding stamping out activities, hygiene,
bio-security, cleaning and disinfection, and quarantine
for the collection of milk and slaughtering in protection
and surveillance zones. Furthermore, there are several
mobile contingency teams available to cull and dispose
of affected animals and clean and disinfect holdings.
There are clear emergency disease reporting mechan-
isms in place, a transparent organisation and communi-
cation network, as well as an animal movement
database. Responsibilities and collaboration on regional,
national and international level are guaranteed.
C. Transition In a first phase of a potential outbreak,
Switzerland would strictly follow a stamping out policy
supported by epidemiological simulation models. If the
outbreak response measures failed and the disease spread
widely, the situation would be re-assessed and a change
in strategy towards a vaccination policy considered [21].
Summary Switzerland is an example of a country that
has been FMD free since successful eradication of the
disease and aims at sustaining the free status (Stage I).
This includes surveillance activities to ensure that an
incursion can be recognised and outbreak response
measure to avoid spread of the disease within the coun-
try in case it occurs.
Conclusions
The proposed conceptual framework clarifies under-
standing of the key relationships between elements of
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tial precursor to economic analysis. The effectiveness of
mitigation is usually measured in terms of prevalence or
incidence reduction. But prevalence and incidence are
not in themselves of economic interest. They matter
because the lower are prevalence or incidence rates the
greater the value, or benefits, obtained as outputs from
resources committed to production.
Each of the three stages identified has been presented
as a distinct phase in the sequential progression of a
given pathogen from its first appearance through to its
eventual control. In practice, mitigation for a defined
pathogen in a target population (e.g. the poultry popula-
tion of a country or region) can only be attributed to
one stage at a time. However, a national or regional
strategy for animal health, such as the EU’s, will contain
a mix of stages according to the status of the particular
pathogens which are the foci of concern. Importantly,
mitigation and its surveillance and intervention activities
defined by technical considerations inevitably have
implications for the data requirements of economic
analysis.
Economic analysis of a national mitigation programme
will need to take into account the costs and benefits of
all essential components of the system. For example, an
economic assessment of HPAI H5N1 mitigation in Viet-
nam would need to incorporate valuation of all eco-
nomic consequences at national level due to the benefit
losses from disease and the costs of its mitigation.
These include the effects of morbidity and mortality in
the human population, on-farm production losses due
to mortality or culling of poultry, implications of move-
ment restrictions for trade, consumption and resource
use, and the financial costs of all surveillance and inter-
vention activities (e.g. wage and salary payments, costs
of test kits, sanitary measures, protective clothing, and
vaccines). Upstream and downstream effects on busi-
nesses, for example breeders and slaughterhouses, as
well as spill-over impacts on other sectors such as tour-
ism also should be evaluated. Problems of food security
in the short term would also have to be considered in a
resource-poor economy with a large agricultural sector.
The benefits would accrue from the avoidance of the
negative economic consequences of loss of output and
capacity to produce, the personal and wider social and
economic implications of human illness or premature
death, the risk from replication of such effects by the
spread of infection to other countries, and the attendant
resource expenditures made in the attempt to constrain
these sources of lost well-being. For a national or inter-
national programme aimed at mitigating several differ-
ent pathogens at once, identical principles apply.
For the initial sustainment stage to be a rational policy
in economic terms, it must be based on an expectation
that the future costs of failing to exclude a pathogen, or
to maintain it at an acceptable level, will exceed recur-
rent sustainment costs. Such future costs are the present
value of the sum of all future lost output value and all
mitigation expenditure potentially incurred in Stages II
and III as a result of failed sustainment now. Surveil-
lance expenditures made now are to limit the need for
future resource expenditures on intervention and sur-
veillance by containing a pathogen’s potential to cause
future adverse output effects. In Stage I it is thus
expected that surveillance is by far the dominant activ-
ity, and the main source of costs. Intuitively, recurrent
surveillance expenditures of this kind are expected to be
lower than the accumulated costs of failing to maintain
a situation of exclusion or acceptability with respect to a
given pathogen. However, the feasibility of implementing
Stage I surveillance may differ considerably between
developed and developing countries. For example,
although wage rates for surveillance workers in labour-
abundant developing countries are relatively low, skills
may be lacking, increasing the risk of adverse conse-
quences from Stage I failure. By contrast, the financial
costs of Stage I surveillance may be high in developed
economies, but their surveillance systems both techni-
cally and economically efficient.
But if Stage I fails, the inevitable result is a switch to a
different approach to mitigation. Surveillance changes to
focus on investigation, the better to inform resource
expenditures when implementing intervention. In that
sense, those additional resources committed to surveil-
lance represent a cost of failed sustainment. If the pur-
pose of the investigation stage is solely to inform Stage
III implementation, potentially it can be attributed to
implementation as a fixed cost necessarily incurred.
From another perspective, if investigation adds to
knowledge about the pathogen in such a way that the
efficiency of mitigation is enhanced into the future, it
becomes a long-term investment activity. Then, for
given current investigation expenditures, lower current
non-monetary benefits can be accepted because the
total benefits that accrue to it do so not just now, but
spread over an extended period of time into the more
distant future.
In Stage III, the quantity of resources allocated to sur-
veillance, and their specific technical characteristics, are
primarily designed to inform the choice, timing, and
scale of related interventions. They also document the
progress of interventions in terms of their impact on
prevalence or incidence reduction and, by implication,
reduction in the economic value of output loss. Thus in
contrast to Stage I sustainment where surveillance
expenditures predominate, in Stage III intervention is
expected to account for the greater proportion. Whether
it does in fact is an empirical question.
Häsler et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:225
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/225
Page 8 of 10A key economic consideration for all stages is to
ascertain the least-cost combinations for surveillance
and intervention, and the associated values of output
losses thereby potentially avoided. By quantifying the
relationship between surveillance, intervention, and cor-
responding prevalence or incidence rates, in principle it
b e c o m e sp o s s i b l et oe s t i m a t ep r e v a l e n c eo ri n c i d e n c e
rates that coincide with the economic optima for net
benefits under different prices for outputs and resources
expended. This is important, because however well-
intentioned are target rates based exclusively on techni-
cal veterinary criteria, only by chance will they approxi-
mate to the best use of scarce resources or, in other
words, the allocation that maximises people’s economic
well-being.
Finally, after successful intervention the mitigation
objective may again be the sustained absence of disease.
However, this is unlikely to be identical to the original
Stage I mitigation. The difference is that now more
information is available about pathogen effects, more
having been learned as a result of investigation and
implementation, and indeed perhaps why earlier sustain-
ment failed in the first place. In that sense, the produc-
tivity of mitigation resources is enhanced by better
knowledge, an unequivocal gain in economic efficiency.
Practical applications
Conceptualising the technical relationship between ele-
ments of mitigation is the foundation on which to build
the evaluation of mitigation as an economic process. It
forms a basis for the development, testing and imple-
mentation of economic frameworks to assess the value
of the three mitigation stages and is the precursor to
economic analysis to identify strategies that maximise
social net benefit.
Because diseases are part of biological systems, and
therefore highly variable and complex, mitigation and
thus surveillance activities need to be dynamic, adaptive
and flexible over time, which is reflected in the
approach presented. All surveillance programmes at one
particular stage are likely to show similar characteristics,
and so are expected to facilitate research and develop-
ment of generic designs. For example, early warning sys-
tems in Stage I must be able to detect the incursion of a
(re-)emerging or exotic pathogen quickly and must
therefore be highly sensitive, which is likely to result in
high costs. On the other hand, generally there is no
need to act immediately on endemic diseases and more
time can be spent to design surveillance programmes
that provide fit-for-purpose data to prioritise and plan
intervention activities. The situation is similar for docu-
mentation of disease freedom, where surveillance needs
to detect the incidence or prevalence of disease for a
defined level of confidence often stipulated in national
or international legislation. In such situations of legisla-
tive constraint, the economic criterion would be to
design and implement the most cost-effective pro-
gramme consistent with achieving it.
The conceptual framework does not of itself provide
any information about the most appropriate method of
data collection, surveillance design, target pathogens or
species. However, it supports decision-makers in identi-
fying the stage of a mitigation process, and forms a
sound conceptual basis to guide the collection of sur-
veillance data. Based on the objective and stages of miti-
gation it reflects the real world setting within which
decision makers need to operate, develop policy, and
allocate their resources. The underlying assumption is
that surveillance always informs mitigation. This helps
to describe the goal of existing and putative mitigation
targets clearly and outlines the need for surveillance to
support that target. Hence, the understanding of the
technical processes of mitigation may also be useful for
algorithms for decision-making processes or compre-
hensive evaluation tools for government surveillance.
Moreover, logical and sustained attention to such pro-
cesses may facilitate the understanding of mitigation
activities in other countries and the coordination of sur-
veillance and intervention efforts at international level.
This is of particular importance when dealing with the
emergence and spread of highly infectious diseases, such
as the recent outbreaks of influenza A virus subtype
H1N1 and severe acute respiratory syndrome.
Summary
The proposed conceptual framework set out above
allows integration of the relationship between disease
mitigation, a source of economic value, and mitigation
resources, a source of economic cost, and thereby lays
the foundation for applied economic analysis. Because
the focus lies on the purpose of surveillance in relation
to mitigation it is also expected to facilitate prioritisation
and selection of the most appropriate surveillance and
intervention activities. The formation of groups with
similar characteristics may inform other research pro-
jects that aim at creating conceptual frameworks relating
to surveillance, such as decision-making algorithms.
Crucially, disease mitigation is both a technical problem
and an economic problem, consideration of the latter
dimension being relatively neglected. In a world of rapid
population growth and increasing demand on scarce
resources, allocating resources to surveillance and inter-
vention in disease mitigation must aim for economic
efficiency as well as technical efficiency.
Appendix 1: Glossary
- Surveillance : The systematic ongoing collection, col-
lation, and analysis of data related to animal health,
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public health hazards, and to demonstrate the absence
of disease, infection or food-borne hazards (modified
according to [8,22])
- Surveillance system: A method of surveillance that
may involve one or more component activities that gen-
erates information on the health, disease or zoonosis
status of animal populations [8].
- Surveillance system component: Has its self-contained
surveillance protocol that focuses on a particular data
source, such as serological bulk milk surveillance and
surveillance of pathological lesions in the abattoir [10].
- Surveillance approach: Can be passive or active [23].
The selection of the surveillance approach is a key
design decision because of its impact on bias and cost.
- Surveillance design: Describes activities and methods
used for implementing, analysing and communicating
surveillance system components, e.g. populations, sam-
pling, diagnostics, case definition, and statistics.
- Intervention: The process of implementing measures
directed at mitigation.
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